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Abstract
We conduct 3-person bargaining experiments in which the surplus being divided
is produced by completing a prior task. Using a Baron-Ferejohn framework, we inves-
tigate how differences in contributions to production affect bargaining under different
decision rules. Under unanimity rule, all proposals and agreements constitute convex
combinations of the equal and proportional splits. Contrary to our predictions, this
pattern largely persists under majority rule. In sharp contrast to prior experiments
in which an exogenous surplus is divided, few subjects attempt to build minimum
winning coalitions when the surplus is jointly produced.
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1 Introduction
Whenever groups of individuals collaborate in productive activities, decisions must be
made about how to distribute gains resulting from joint production. Unless the division
is contractually specified ex ante, it must instead be negotiated ex post. For example,
governments need to distribute the tax budget across different departments and private
companies need to decide how to allocate revenues across different divisions. Such nego-
tiations are likely to be especially complicated when different group members have made
different ‘contributions’ to the prior productive activity, inducing disagreement about the
degree of ‘proportionality’ that should prevail.1 How are such disagreements handled under
different decision rules? This is what we want to investigate in this paper.
A number of authors have experimentally shown that joint production can lead to
the establishment of ‘subjective claims’ to a resulting surplus, and investigated how such
claims affect bargaining behavior. In these experiments, groups of two or more subjects
‘produce’ a joint surplus by completing a real effort task such as answering trivia questions.
Subsequently, subjects bargain over how to distribute that surplus. In a bilateral context,
? and ? find that subjects expect distributions to reflect relative contributions (e.g. the
number of correct answers given), and also judge such proportionality as fair. Further,
they show that bargaining outcomes reflect these considerations. ? extend the analysis
to a three-player context, comparing the impact of contributions under three different
bargaining procedures, all of which require unanimous consent to reach agreement. They
also find that fairness judgments reflect individual contributions, but to a lesser extent
than suggested by a strict norm of proportionality.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to experimentally investigate majority rule bar-
gaining with joint production. All prior experiments on bargaining with joint production
have looked at either bilateral situations or at multilateral situations with unanimity rule.
There are many interesting situations, however, where distributive decisions are made us-
ing majority rule. Examples include labor-management negotiations, coalition formation,
bargaining over distributive politics, and budget negotiations in national or international
organizations.
As an example, consider budget allocation decisions within the European Union. Here,
representatives from different member states bargain over how to allocate resources, both
across different budget categories (e.g. agriculture, regional development, etc.) and within
1Such disagreements are likely to be especially pronounced in contexts where relative contributions are
difficult to assess, or where they are perceived to result from ‘luck’ as opposed to ‘effort’ (?????).
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categories, to projects located in specific member states. Although many expenditures
serve to create shared benefits for all member states (e.g. defense, administration), there
is some truth to the common perception that the process ultimately boils down to the
splitting of a cake between the separate member states. Likewise, a widely held view is
that some member states are entitled to a larger slice of that cake than others, because
they have made larger contributions in the form of membership fees.2
There are good reasons to believe that bargaining behavior and outcomes under ma-
jority rule are different from those observed under unanimity rule. Under unanimity rule,
each player holds veto power which can be used to defend one’s claim. This is fundamen-
tally different under majority rule, where players can form minimum winning coalitions
and exclude certain group members from the allocation. Prior experiments on majority
rule bargaining over an exogenous surplus have consistently shown that most games end
with such agreements. Hence, an important question is whether we continue to observe
such outcomes when all players hold claims to the surplus. If so, an interesting question
is which player is more likely to be included in a coalition - the one who has a larger or a
smaller claim?
In this paper, we experimentally investigate how claims based on contributions to pro-
duction affect bargaining behavior under both unanimity and majority rule. In our exper-
iment, groups of 3 subjects bargain over a surplus which they have previously produced
by separately engaging in an individual real effort task. The bargaining procedure is a
finite horizon version of the ? game (henceforth BF game). Our main treatment variable
(exogenously manipulated) is the number of votes required to pass a proposal (majority vs.
unanimity rule). In addition, we observe a number of different (endogenously determined)
situations in terms of the relative contributions the group members have made, depending
on their individual performance in the real effort task. We investigate and compare how
the resulting claims affect proposals, voting behavior, passage rates, and final outcomes
under each rule.
Our main findings are the following. Under both rules, proposals and voting behav-
ior are significantly affected by claims. Under unanimity rule, virtually all proposals and
2For example, in the recent ‘Brexit’ referendum, Britain’s rising net contributions, calculated as the
fees contributed to the EU minus received transfers, was one of the most contentious issues. Not only EU
critics but also the popular media discussed this issue as an argument against UK’s continued membership.
Net contributions were also a central topic during Scotland’s first independence referendum in 2014 which
would have enabled Scotland to become and independent member of the EU. Prior to the referendum, the
government examined Scotland’s potential role within the EU and critically pointed out that Scotland was
likely to become a net contributor.
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outcomes constitute convex combinations of the three-way equal split and the split that is
exactly proportional to relative contributions. This result is consistent with prior evidence
discussed in the next section. More surprisingly, we observe a very similar pattern under
majority rule. In particular, the vast majority of proposals allocate positive shares to all
participants. This result stands in stark contrast to comparable experiments on BF bar-
gaining in which subjects divide ‘manna from heaven’ and most subjects propose minimum
winning coalitions.
Under both decision rules, we find that players who have made relatively smaller con-
tributions tend to make more equal (i.e. less proportional) proposals. This pattern is more
pronounced under majority rule. In combination with the fact that players with lower
claims are more likely to support more equal proposals, this leads to more equal outcomes
under majority rule when a majority (i.e. two players) have made relatively small contri-
butions. Finally, we find that majority rule leads to a higher passage rate than unanimity
rule, especially when group members have made different contributions to the surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ?? discusses related literature.
Section ?? presents our experimental design. Section ?? summarizes our hypotheses. Re-
sults are presented in section ??. Section ?? concludes. Further analyses and experimental
instructions are provided in an online Appendix (included in the present version for review).
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to a recent literature analyzing how claims, resulting from joint
production, affect behavior and outcomes in experimental bargaining games. For a review
on bargaining games with joint production see ?. Most closely related are three recent
studies which examine the role of claims in bilateral (??) and multilateral bargaining (?).
In these experiments, subjects earn endowments by answering a series of quiz questions.
These endowments are then combined to form a common surplus. Subsequently, either two
(??) or three (?) subjects bargain over the distribution of the surplus using unanimity rule.
A common finding in all three papers is that subjects who have made higher contributions
are offered more compared to subjects with lower contributions. Further evidence suggests
that individuals derive ‘subjective claims’ which reflect their relative contributions to the
jointly produced surplus. According to ?, claims (or ‘entitlements’) are “rights, as perceived
by the individual (...) that go along with a motivational disposition to defend them” (?,
p.24). Moreover, he defines obligations as the counterpart of claims, i.e. people will feel
4
obliged to comply with what they perceive as another person’s right. Hence, claims appear
to capture what a person expects to receive as well as her subjective fairness view.
In sum, several prior studies have found evidence that claims have a significant impact
on bargaining under unanimity rule, i.e. when all group members must consent to the final
agreement. In contrast, there is to our knowledge no experimental evidence on the effects
of claims under majority rule. The key difference is that a majority coalition (in our case
2 players) can, in principle, ignore the claims of a minority player, as his consent to the
allocation is not required. If no player can enforce his own claim by vetoing a potential
agreement, do claims become meaningless?
Of obvious relevance to this point are several studies looking at two-person dictator
games with a jointly produced surplus. ? conduct an experiment in which subjects con-
tribute endowments earned in a prior investment stage. Importantly, endowments are a
combination of the sum a subject decided to invest in one of two projects and a randomly
determined high or low interest rate paid for each dollar invested. Both subjects in a
pair decide how to allocate the joint surplus and one (randomly chosen) decision is imple-
mented. Subjects are repeatedly matched and thus take decisions in different distributional
situations which allows the authors to classify subjects into types. They find that a ma-
jority of subjects can be classified as ‘liberal egalitarian’ or ‘libertarian’ types and thus
take the investment made by the other subject into account when choosing an allocation.
? conduct dictator games with children in grades 5 to 13 where the surplus is the result
of a real effort task. They find that as children get older, their offers more strongly reflect
the contributions of their partners. In a recent meta study on dictator game behavior, ?
finds that dictators tend to give less if they have earned the endowment or take less from
the receiver if she has earned the endowment. Overall, these experiments provide evidence
that dictators tend to ‘respect’ a recipient’s claim, at least to some extent, even though
the recipient has no veto power. Applied to our own context, this suggests that subjects
may be reluctant to form minimum winning coalitions under majority rule, and instead
allocate positive shares to all players.
The previous findings from unanimity bargaining and the dictator game appear to be
compatible with the idea that behavior is motivated by fairness concerns which take claims
into account. Thus, the literature examining ‘fairness’ of outcomes in situations with joint
production is also informative for this paper. For example, ? discusses the role of the
so-called ‘equity principle’ for understanding behavior in allocation tasks and bargaining
games. He defines a ‘proportional equity rule’ as follows: “The proportional equity rule
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can be thought of as a modification of the equal division principle. Whereas the equal
division principle prescribes the same reward for every person, the proportional equity rule
prescribes the same reward for every unit of achievement.” Among others, he discusses
reward allocation experiments conducted by ? and ?. In these experiments, subjects first
engage in a task and subsequently one subject is asked to allocate a sum of money. As
summarized by ?, subjects tend to divide equally if performance in the task was equal.
If performance was however unequal, there was a tendency towards more proportional
distributions. ? reviews a very large collection of empirical studies (mostly experiments
and vignette surveys) to assess the degree to which different conceptions of ‘justice’ are
descriptive of how people commonly make impartial fairness judgments. He proposes “a
multi-criterion theory of justice’ (...) in which three justice principles are interpreted,
weighted, and applied in a manner that depends on context.” (?, p. 1235) These prin-
ciples are equity, efficiency, and need. In discussing evidence on the ‘equity principle’, he
cites extensive experimental and survey evidence showing that subjects consider it fair to
distribute resources in a way that is proportional to all variables under a person’s control,
such as work effort. In the multilateral bargaining game discussed above, ? find that
impartial fairness assessments, elicited from independent and unaffected participants, are
a convex combination of proportionality and equality, giving rise to pluralism of fairness
norms which might guide individual behavior in these situations.
An important finding is that such fairness perceptions can be self-servingly biased. For
example, ? find that low contributors are more likely than high contributors to judge an
egalitarian division of the surplus as fair. Further evidence comes from an experiment
by ?, in which all subjects perform the same real effort task (prepare a given amount of
letters) but earn different piece rates. The funds of both subjects are then pooled and
either the subject with the higher piece rate or an uninvolved third person decides how to
allocate the funds among the two subjects. The results of the experiment indicate that
partial subjects are more likely to deviate from the accountability principle than impartial
subjects, indicating a self-serving bias. In summary, these findings suggest that (at least
a majority of) people judge proportionality as fair, and that the degree of proportionality
they favor might be self-servingly biased. We conjecture that such judgments are likely to
affect bargaining behavior under majority rule.
Finally, we add to a vast experimental literature on the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining
game (??????????). The central findings of that literature can be briefly summarized
as follows. First, most proposers form minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) under ma-
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jority rule, especially after gaining some experience with the game. Second, the most
commonly observed proposals and agreements implement equal splits (either overall or
within a MWC). Third, unanimity rule leads to more delay as compared to majority rule.3
To our knowledge, we are the first to report on a Baron-Ferejohn experiment involving
the division of a previously produced surplus. ? studies a majoritarian BF game in which
the surplus to be allocated is the result of voluntary contributions. His main interest is
how allowing subjects to bargain over the distribution affects incentives to contribute. Our
context differs from this in several respects. First, performance in the real effort task is not
a strategic choice given that players are not informed about the decision rule when they
earn their contributions. Second, differences in performance result at least in part from
luck, such that there is likely more disagreement about the distribution of the surplus.
These design choices reflect the fact that we are interested in the influence of claims (as
exogenous parameters) on bargaining behavior.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of of two stages, a ‘production’ stage followed by a ‘bargaining’
stage. In the production stage, subjects individually earn ‘points’ by answering a series
of trivia questions organized into 12 ‘blocks’. Each block consisted of 2 multiple choice
questions on different topics (i.e. geography, history, arts, science). On each block, sub-
jects could earn either zero, one, or three points, depending on whether neither, one, or
both questions were answered correctly. Each block contained one ‘easy’ question that
we expected most subjects to answer correctly, and a second question that varied in diffi-
culty. After completing the production stage, each subject thus had ‘produced’ a list of 12
separate scores, each either 0,1, or 3 points.
After all subjects had completed the production stage, they proceeded to the bargaining
stage. This consisted of 12 separate rounds. In each round, subjects were matched into
groups of three. Each group was then assigned a surplus equal to 5 EUR times the sum of
three randomly and independently chosen scores, one from each of the lists that they had
previously produced. Thus, the scores contributed by the members of a group would usually
come from different ‘quiz blocks’. The sampling of scores was done with replacement, so
that it was possible for a given subject to have the same quiz block selected multiple
3Recent findings by ? suggest that free communication (chatting) between the group members leads
to more unequal agreements under majority rule and to more equal allocations under unanimity rule. In
addition, communication virtually eliminates delay under both rules.
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times over the course of the experiment. Each subject was informed about the quiz block
selected for her and about the number of points she had earned. In addition, they were
informed about the number of points contributed by the other players, as well as each
group member’s percentage share of all contributed points. Subjects were not informed
about the quiz block selected for the other two group members.
These design features were chosen with three goals in mind. First, the presence of
an easy question in every quiz block was meant to ensure that all subjects would have a
positive claim, at least in most games. Second, the more difficult questions should lead to
heterogeneity in claims, as some but not all subjects will score 3 points on the quiz block
chosen for them. Third, differences in difficulty between blocks implies that individual
contributions constitute a noisy signal of relative performance. That is, subjects could
not be sure whether differences in the number of points contributed were due to good
performance (answering difficult questions) or luck (having an easy quiz block chosen).4
The bargaining game itself followed a finite horizon Baron-Ferejohn framework. That
is, bargaining proceeded over a finite number of discrete rounds. Within each round, the
sequence of events was as follows. First, all subjects were asked to propose a division of the
surplus. Next, all subjects voted either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on each of the three proposals made in
their group. Once the votes had been cast, one of the three proposals was randomly selected
and the votes were counted.5 Depending on the treatment, the proposal passed if either a
majority (two) or all three subjects voted ‘yes’. In that case, the game ended. Otherwise,
the surplus shrank by 20% and bargaining proceeded to a new round. If the surplus fell
below 2 EUR (i.e. after 8 rounds of bargaining), the game was terminated and all group
members earned 0 EUR.6 At the end of the experiment, one of the 12 bargaining games
was randomly chosen and subjects were paid according to the corresponding outcome.
The experiment was conducted at the AWI Lab at the University of Heidelberg, Ger-
many, in June 2016 and January 2017. In total, 198 students, from various disciplines,
participated (108 in the June and 90 in the January sessions). We conducted twelve ses-
sions, six for each treatment (majority and unanimity rule). Each session involved 18
4Note that the element of ‘luck’ is indeed present because a given subject’s quiz scores for different
games are drawn with replacement. Therefore some subjects will be luckier than others even if they perform
equally well, and even if we aggregate across all games played.
5In the standard formulation of the BF game, the proposer is selected at the beginning of the round
and only one proposal is made. Our procedure allows us to observe three times as many proposals and
votes. Although this does not alter the SSPE predictions, it may impact real behavior if subjects react to
the additional information provided. However, any such effects are of course present in all our treatment
conditions.
6This feature of our design implies that ours is a finite horizon BF game.
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Table 1: Symmetric equilibrium proposals
Proposer share Responder share
Majority rule 73% 27% (to one)
Unanimity rule 46% 27% (to both)
subjects, divided into three matching groups of six participants.7 Due to no-shows, we
conducted three sessions with 12 subjects. Hence, in total we have 33 matching groups
(17 for majority and 16 for unanimity rule). Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were
randomly assigned to isolated computer terminals. Paper instructions (reproduced in the
Appendix) were handed out and questions were answered in private. The experiment was
programmed in z-Tree (?). Sessions took approximately 70 minutes, and average earnings
amounted to 13 EUR (highest: 23.5 EUR, lowest: 4 EUR) including a 4 EUR show-up fee.
4 Benchmark predictions and hypotheses
While the BF bargaining game admits multiple subgame perfect equilibria, the prior liter-
ature has typically focused on symmetric and stationary equilibria, which are (essentially)
unique. For the finite horizon version, the relevant equilibrium concept is Symmetric
Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE). See ? for a detailed analysis. As established there,
the unique SMPE has three interesting properties which can be tested empirically. The first
is that proposers attempt to form minimum winning coalitions in which only the number
of individuals required to vote yes receive positive offers. Second, these ‘coalition partners’
are offered exactly their continuation value, i.e. the amount that they expect to receive
if the current proposal were to fail. This implies an unequal distribution of the surplus,
favoring the proposer. Third, the first proposal passes without delay. All three of these
predictions are independent of the decision rule being employed. The predicted outcomes
for our version of the game (n = 3 players and discount factor δ = .8) are presented in
Table ??.
Naturally, these SMPE predictions are unaffected by the prior production phase con-
ducted in our experiment. By definition, they are based on the assumption that all players
7Admittedly, these are small matching groups. However, we believe that repeated game effects within
the matching groups are unlikely. First, subjects were not told about the size of the matching group.
In the instructions they were informed that they would be re-matched at the beginning of each round.
Second, the identifying labels on the decision screens changed randomly between games. The advantage
of implementing small matching groups is that we obtain 3 independent observations for each session.
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employ the same strategy, effectively ignoring any differences in the relative contributions
they have made to the surplus. Under unanimity rule, the SMPE corresponds to the only
subgame perfect equilibrium. The fact that players can selectively build coalitions under
majority rule, leads to multiple and asymmetric equilibria. Hence, in these cases players
could use the relative contributions to coordinate on asymmetric and / or non-stationary
equilibria of the game (see ?). For this reason, it is especially interesting to study how
claims affect behavior under majority rule.
In addition to the SMPE predictions, we formulate a number of additional hypotheses
which are based on the idea that players are motivated by material self-interest as well
as notions of fairness, which take claims into account (??). Players are assumed to be
heterogeneous in how much weight they place on either of these two motives. As outlined
in Section ??, prior evidence on unanimity rule bargaining appears to support this idea,
and demonstrates that such preferences have a systematic impact on behavior and out-
comes. We separately formulate our additional hypotheses for situations with symmetric
claims (i.e. all group members have made the same contribution) and situations with
heterogeneous claims (i.e. the group members have made different contributions).
Symmetric Claims Situations with symmetric claims are those where all three group
members have contributed either 1 point (5 EUR) or 3 points (15 EUR) to the surplus.
Various theories of fairness, such as summarized by ? suggest that the unique ‘fair’ outcome
in this situation is an equal split. This should motivate ‘fair-minded’ players to propose
the equal split, and to vote for it (and against other proposals). Anticipating this behavior,
even purely self-interested players should do the same under unanimity rule, knowing that
anything else is likely to only increase delay.8 Thus, under unanimity rule, we hypothesize
that subjects will propose and agree on the equal split.
Hypothesis 1. In symmetric situations with unanimity rule, most proposers suggest three-
way equal splits. Group members more often vote ‘yes’ on such proposals than on unequal
splits. Therefore, equal splits pass with higher probability.
The predictions implied for majority rule are less straightforward. Since proposers can
build minimum winning coalitions, ‘selfish’ (or less ‘fair-minded’) players may attempt to
do so, hoping that the included player will vote ‘yes’, either because he is also selfish,
or because the larger share that he can be given (e.g. 50% instead of 33%) is enough
8That is, if at least one of the players in a given group is ‘fair-minded’ in the way outlined, no unequal
division can pass under unanimity rule.
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to outweigh his fairness concerns. Thus, depending on (beliefs about) the distribution
of types in a population, ‘selfish’ proposers will build minimum winning coalitions, and
perhaps make relatively generous offers to their partners within such coalitions. This
could result in a mix of three-way and two-way equal splits being proposed. When voting,
fair-minded players should be more likely to support ‘grand’ proposals that are equal
splits, and all players should be more likely, ceteris paribus, to support proposals that
allocate larger shares to them. In sum, it appears difficult to predict which allocations
will be proposed under majority rule. Relative to unanimity rule, however, we can expect
minimum winning coalitions to be more common. We therefore formulate the following
hypothesis to be compared against the results obtained.
Hypothesis 2. In symmetric situation with majority rule, proposers attempt to build mini-
mum winning coalitions. These coalitions are more likely to pass the larger the share offered
to the coalition partner.
Asymmetric claims Our second set of hypotheses is formulated for situations in which
the group members have made different contributions, leading to heterogeneous claims.
Given that high contributors expect to receive higher shares, and indeed people regard this
as fair (??), it is difficult for proposers to ignore claims under unanimity rule, as doing
so is likely to result in failure of their proposal. Thus, players with larger contributions
should receive higher offers. This prediction is in line with the existing evidence on the
effect of heterogeneous claims under unanimity rule (???).
Hypothesis 3. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, shares offered are increasing
in relative points contributed.
In the presence of a self-serving bias, proposals should be more proportional the larger
a player’s contribution, as material self-interest and fairness concerns are aligned in these
cases. Similarly, when voting, players with higher contributions should more often vote
‘yes’ the more proportional a proposal than individuals with lower contributions.
Hypothesis 4. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, individuals with larger con-
tributions more often suggest, and are more likely to vote ‘yes’ on the proportional split
than members with smaller contributions.
When claims are asymmetric, individuals are likely to differ in how much proportionality
they perceive as ‘fair’, thus causing heterogeneity in fairness views. This, in turn, may
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lead to more delay in negotiations in asymmetric as compared to symmetric situations.
In line with this prediction, ? find that the bargaining duration significantly increases
in treatments where subjects derive heterogeneous claims based on performance feedback
relative to treatments in which no performance feedback is provided.
Hypothesis 5. Under unanimity rule, delay occurs more frequently when players have
asymmetric claims than when claims are symmetric.
One reason why claims are likely to influence bargaining outcomes under unanimity rule
is that all players have veto power which can be used to enforce claims as well as fairness
perceptions. As was already discussed, this situation is fundamentally altered when major-
ity rule is used. A player seeking to maximize his payoff may propose a minimum winning
coalition excluding one responder. When responder claims differ, it is even conceivable that
the proposer would systematically discriminate against the player with the larger claim, as
she might be perceived as more ‘expensive’. This hypothesis may fail if players’ fairness
conceptions cause them to be reluctant to exclude others from the winning coalition. As
mentioned above, evidence from dictator games with prior production indicate that many
subjects are indeed reluctant to exclude others in situations where they could do so. Note,
however, that the frequency of minimum winning coalitions in (standard) Baron-Ferejohn
experiments is significantly larger than the frequency of zero offers in standard dictator
games. That is, subjects in multilateral bargaining games appear to be more willing to
allocate nothing to one player. Therefore we tentatively conjecture that this willingness to
exclude a player from payment will persist in our setting, even when the surplus is jointly
produced. These considerations lead us to formulate the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, proposers attempt to build
minimum winning coalition.
Should this hypothesis prove to be true, an interesting follow-up question is which
responder is more likely to be included in a minimum winning coalition. When responder
‘claims’ differ, two competing considerations may play a role. On the one hand, the
responder with the larger claim may appear more deserving, and thus fairness concerns
may dictate that she be included in the coalition. On the other hand, it appears likely that
the responder with the smaller claim will be ‘cheaper’ - i.e. more likey to vote ‘yes’ for a
given share being offered. Thus, proposers may strategically exclude the player with the
larger claim. Which of these considerations prevails more often is an empirical question.
We will organize our analysis around the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 7. When the responders’ contributions differ, proposers who build minimum
winning coalitions are more likely to include responders with smaller contributions.
As under unanimity rule, heterogeneous claims are likely to cause more disagreement
in subjective fairness ideals which will lead to more delay in negotiations as compared to
situations with homogeneous claims.
Hypothesis 8. Under majority rule, delay occurs more frequently when players have asym-
metric claims.
Majority versus Unanimity rule All hypotheses formulated thus far concern the ef-
fects of claims within each of our treatments (majority and unanimity rule). Finally, we
formulate two hypotheses regarding differences between the two treatments. First, claims
should affect proposals (and final outcomes) more strongly under unanimity than under
majority rule. Under unanimity rule, the existence of veto power implies that claims and
fairness perceptions can be enforced. Under majority rule, in contrast, subjects can trade
off fairness against higher shares for themselves which might cause less fair-minded play-
ers to propose minimum winning coalitions and even relatively fair-mindeded individuals
might propose less proportional and more equal divisions of the surplus. Thus, under
majority rule proposals and final outcomes should shift away from the proportional split.
Hypothesis 9. Proposals and final outcomes under majority rule are less proportional
than under unanimity rule whenever the proposer has made a smaller contribution.
The final hypothesis concerns the length of the bargaining process under both decision
rules. Given that under majority rule less members need to consent, majority rule should
lead to faster agreement than unanimity rule. This effect should be particularly pronounced
in situations with heterogeneous claims as group members are more likely to hold conflicting
fairness views. The final hypothesis is also in line with previous research conducted on the
BF bargaining game. For example, ?? and ? find that delay occurs more frequently under
unanimity rule.
Hypothesis 10. Delay occurs more frequently under unanimity than under majority rule,
especially in situations involving heterogeneous claims.
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5 Results
As indicated above, we purposefully designed the quiz blocks such that most subjects
should earn at least one point, and some would earn three points. We did this because
we want to focus on situations where all group members have made positive contributions,
but the size of these contributions may differ. Table ?? summarizes the frequency with
which we observed various constellations of points within the bargaining groups that were
formed in both treatments. By focusing on situations where all contributions are positive,
we lose approximately 25% of the data. We analyze these excluded cases in the Online
Appendix. Also, we have relatively few observations where all subjects contributed either
one point or three points. Since the relative contributions are the same in these situations,
we will pool these data in the subsequent analysis.
Table 2: Constellations of points contributed
Number of games
Contributions Surplus Unanimity rule Majority rule
(1,1,1) 15 EUR 20 30
(3,3,3) 45 EUR 47 39
(1,1,3) 25 EUR 87 117
(1,3,3) 35 EUR 140 116
not all positive various 90 106
Total 408 384
As is typically done in the literature on Baron-Ferejohn bargaining, most of our em-
pirical analysis will focus on the first round of bargaining. Given our method of having
all subjects make a proposal, we observe three proposals per game. In situations where
relative contributions differ, we will distinguish cases according to whether the proposer
has made a relatively large or small contribution.9 With this in mind, Table ?? presents
the number of proposals we observed in each of five possible situations. Here and later,
the first coordinate of the contribution vector (in bold) denotes the relative contribution of
the proposer. When responder contributions differ, they are ordered such that the smaller
contributor is listed first (i.e. the second coordinate). When responder contributions are
the same, they are ordered alphabetically according to the letter i.d. (‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’) that
players were randomly assigned at the start of the game.
9Recall that, by design, individual contributions can take on only two values, 1 and 3.
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Table 3: Situations observed (first round)
Percentage Number of proposals
Contributions† Unanimity rule Majority rule
(33,33,33) 201 207
(20,20,60) 174 234
(60,20,20) 87 117
(14,43,43) 140 116
(43,14,43) 280 232
Total 882 906
† The first coordinate is the proposer’s percentage contribution.
5.1 Symmetric claims
We begin by discussing the situations where all subjects have contributed the same number
of points (either 1 or 3). Figure ?? displays the distribution of proposals within a simplex.
In this and the following figures, the simplex is defined such that the shares allocated to
responders 1 and 2 are measured along the horizontal and vertical axes, respectively. As
mentioned above, responders are ordered alphabetically according to the letter i.d. they
were assigned on the decision screen. The south-west corner would correspond to a proposal
where the proposer demands the entire pie, and the right and top corners represent points
where everything is allocated to responder 1 and responder 2, respectively. For orientation,
a number of focal points are highlighted. Equal splits (both two- and three way) are marked
in blue. The proportional split (reflecting claims) is marked in red. (In the symmetric case,
the proportional split is identical to the three-way equal split.) The size of the bubbles
reflect the relative frequency of the corresponding proposals, and the pie charts within the
bubbles display the fraction of proposals that pass (in green) and fail (in red). Finally, each
(sub)figure contains information about the three most frequently observed proposals. For
example, the most frequently observed proposal under unanimity rule is an equal split.10
It accounts for 88% of all offers, and it passes 95% of the time.
As can be easily recognized by inspecting Figure ??, behavior in the symmetric situation
is quite similar under both rules. In particular, the vast majority of proposals are either
equal splits or very close to equal splits, and these proposals almost always pass. Overall,
94% and 95% of proposals pass under unanimity and majority rule, respectively (see Table
10Although the figure displays these as (34, 33, 33), these may include some proposals that were actually
(33, 33, 33). The simplex is constructed such that the first coordinate is 100 minus the other two, i.e. we
are assuming that all proposals sum to 100.
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Figure 1: Proposals and passage rates, c = (33, 33, 33)
(a) Unanimity rule (N = 201)
88% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=95%
5% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=90%
2% x=(33, 34, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N = 207)
76% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=99%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=89%
2% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 2: Proposals and passage rates, no claims†
(a) Unanimity rule (N = 339)
57% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=94%
18% x=(36, 32, 32) pass=52%
5% x=(40, 30, 30) pass=6%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N = 354)
12% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=98%
12% x=(60, 40, 0) pass=98%
12% x=(60, 0, 40) pass=88%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
† These data are taken from a previous experiment (?)
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5 below). Under majority rule, we observe only few minimum winning coalitions being
proposed and all of them suggest the two-way equal split.
While this behavior was to be expected under unanimity rule (see Hypothesis 1), it is
somewhat surprising under majority rule. As mentioned, previous experiments on the BF
game without claims have found that most proposers build minimum winning coalitions
(MWCs), excluding one responder from payment. As an example, consider Figure ??,
which presents the distribution of proposals in a prior BF experiment without claims (?).
Our results suggest that the willingness to completely exclude one player from payment
is substantially reduced when the surplus being distributed has been jointly produced.
Comparing our own and results reported in ?, we find that the fraction of MWCs is
significantly lower in our sample (Chi-squared test, 11% vs. 66%, p < 0.01, N1 = 207 and
N2 = 354). Thus, we can reject Hypothesis 2.
11
One reason why individuals might propose a three-way equal split more often than
a MWC is that MWCs may be less likely to pass. Although we have only few relevant
observations, we find that the passage rate in MWCs is smaller than in grand coalitions
(85% versus 96%). To test for significance, we compare the fraction of passed proposals in
grand and minimum winning coalitions for each matching group. We do not find that the
difference in passage rates is statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks
test, p = 0.53, N = 13).12 To the extent that subjects could have anticipated or learned
this over time, the fact that few MWCs are proposed suggests that individuals indeed
regard it as fair to respect other subjects’ claims.
To analyze how the location of a proposal affects voting behavior, we run a Random-
effects probit regression using the voting decision as dependent variable.13 The independent
variables are the Euclidean distance to the equal (proportional) split and the period. Under
both decision rules, we find that the probability to vote ‘yes’ decreases significantly as the
distance to the equal split increases (Average marginal effect; Unanimity rule β = −0.02,
p < 0.01; Majority rule β = −0.01, p < 0.01). Hence, deviations from the equal split result
in higher disapproval.14
11It should be noted that the frequency of MWCs increases over time. If we focus only on the final 4
periods, it is 17%. This is still substantially smaller than what is observed in periods 9-12 of ? (79%,
p < 0.01, N1 = 48 and N2 = 96)
12We observe MWCs being proposed in 13 of 17 matching groups in the majority rule treatment.
13Each individual votes on the proposals of both other group members in every game. We use panel
methods assuming that voting decisions are uncorrelated with individual characteristics.
14Given that all MWC proposals suggest a two-way equal split, we cannot test the second part of
Hypothesis 2.
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Result 1. In symmetric situations, the vast majority of proposers suggest a three-way equal
split under both decision rules. Under majority rule, only a small number of proposers
attempt to build a minimum winning coalition. Those that do always propose a two-way
equal split. Under both decision rules, proposals are more often rejected, the larger the
distance to the equal split. (Consistent with Hypothesis 1, inconsistent with Hypothesis 2.)
5.2 Asymmetric claims, unanimity rule
Next we look at situations in which the group members have contributed different amounts
to the surplus. We begin by considering behavior under unanimity rule.
Figure ?? displays the distribution of proposals and corresponding passage rates in
the c = (20, 20, 60) situation. The left panel depicts cases in which the proposer has
contributed 20%, the right panel those in which his contribution is 60%.
Three patterns are immediately visible. First, virtually all proposals are located on a
line connecting the proportional (marked in red) to the three-way equal split (blue). Second,
the distribution of proposals shifts away from the equal split and towards the proportional
split when the proposer’s own contribution is relatively larger (right panel). In these cases,
the proposer suggests the proportional split almost twice as often (57% vs. 30%). Finally,
the proportional split passes less often when the proposer has made a comparatively large
contribution (68% vs. 85%) but this difference is only marginally significant (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test, N = 30, p = 0.1).
The corresponding distributions for the c = (14, 43, 43) situation are depicted in Figure
??. Again, the left and right panels depict the cases where the proposer’s contribution is
relatively small (i.e. 14%) or large (43%). In the second asymmetric situation, we observe
the exact same pattern as in the previously discussed c = (60, 20, 20) situation.
Given that virtually all proposals in both asymmetric situations are somewhere in
between the equal and proportional splits, it follows immediately that offers are affected
by claims. Table ?? summarizes the average offers made in all situations and in both
treatments. Focusing on the middle column for now, we can see that the ordinal ranking
of offers received matches that of the claims in all situations. This pattern is consistent
with Hypothesis 3.
Result 2. In asymmetric situations with unanimity rule, shares offered are increasing in
relative points contributed. (Consistent with Hypothesis 3.)
In order to assess the statistical significance of these patterns, we take advantage of
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Figure 3: Proposals and passage rates, c = (20, 20, 60), unanimity rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N = 174)
30% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=83%
30% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=85%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=84%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (60, 20, 20) (N = 87)
57% x=(60, 20, 20) pass=68%
20% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=94%
10% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=78%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 4: Proposals and passage rates, c = (14, 43, 43), unanimity rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=140)
52% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=93%
18% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=80%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=65%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=280)
44% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=91%
34% x=(43, 14, 43) pass=74%
9% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=92%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Table 4: Average proposed shares†
Percentage Unanimity Rule Majority Rule
Contributions Average Offers Average Offers
(c0, c1, c2) (y0, y1, y2) (y0, y1, y2)
(33, 33, 33) (33, 33, 33) (36, 34, 30)
(20, 20, 60) (26, 25, 49) (31, 29, 40)
(60, 20, 20) (53, 24, 23) (55, 25, 20)
(14, 43, 43) (22, 39, 39) (28, 39, 33)
(43, 14, 43) (40, 19, 40) (43, 16, 41)
† When responder contributions are the same, they are
ordered according to the letter i.d. assigned to them
in the corresponding bargaining game.
the fact that almost all proposals are located along the line connecting the proportional
to the three-way equal split. This allows us to reduce the data to a single dimension, as
follows. For each proposal yi, we identify its scalar projection onto the line described by
the equation
yi = (1− ai) · equal split + ai · proportional split
The corresponding value of ai characterizes the point on the line which is closest to the
proposal, i.e. whose connecting vector is orthogonal to the line. Thus, ai = 0 corresponds
to the equal, and ai = 1 to the proportional split. After we identify the ai for each proposal,
we can look at the distribution of the ai as well as its effect on voting and passage rates.
Figure ?? displays the distribution of ai values in the c = (20, 20, 60) situation. As
above, the left and right panels show the situation where the proposer’s own contribution
is 20% and 60%, respectively. Within each bar, the lighter region represents the fraction of
proposals that passed. Comparing the right to the left panel, we see that the distribution
appears to be shifted to the right, with nearly twice as much weight on the proportional
split (located at ai = 1) when the proposer’s own contribution is large. Using paired match-
ing group averages as our unit of observation, we find that this difference is statistically
significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p < 0.01, N = 16).
The corresponding distribution of ai values for the c = (14, 43, 43) situation are dis-
played in Figure ??. Again, we see that the distribution shifts to the right, i.e. towards the
proportional split, when the proposer has made a relatively large contribution (right panel).
To test for significance, we compare the average values of ai in all matching groups and
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Figure 5: Distribution of ai values, c = (20, 20, 60), unanimity rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=174)
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(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=87)
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10%
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Figure 6: Distribution of ai values, c = (14, 43, 43), unanimity rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=140)
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(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=280)
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find a significant difference (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p < 0.01, N = 16).
Hence, in both asymmetric situations we find that proposals are more proportional if the
proposer himself has made a relatively large contribution. This supports the first part of
Hypothesis 4.
To assess the effect of proposal location on voting behavior, we run Random-effects
probit regressions. Results for unanimity rule are summarized in the top part of Table
??. In each regression, the dependent variable is the voting decision, coded as vi = 1 if a
subject votes ‘yes’ and vi = 0 otherwise. The independent variables are ai and the period.
For the (20, 20, 60) situation, we find that the coefficient on ai is positive and significant
for responder 2 but insignificant for responder 1. That is, the subject with the larger claim
is significantly more likely to vote yes if the proposal is closer to the proportional split.
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We observe a similar pattern in the (43, 14, 43) situation. Namely, the coefficient on ai
is positive and significant for responder 2 but negative and significant for responder 1.
Hence, in this situation the individual with the larger claim is more likely to vote yes if
the proposal is closer to the proportional split while the opposite is true for the individual
with the smaller claim. We also find that the coefficient of ai is positive in the (14, 43, 43)
situation where both responders have made a relatively large contribution. In contrast, we
find no significant opposite effect of ai on voting in the (60, 20, 20) situation, where both
responders have made a relatively small contribution. In summary, our results indicate that
responders with relatively large contributions vote ‘yes’ more often the more proportional
a proposal. On the other hand, we find only partial evidence that individuals with lower
contributions less often vote ‘yes’, as suspected in the second part of Hypothesis 4.
Result 3. In asymmetric situations and under unanimity rule, individuals who have made
relatively large contributions make proposals that are closer to the proportional split than
do individuals who have made relatively small contributions. Responders with large contri-
butions are more likely to vote ‘yes’ on proposals closer to the proportional split. (Partially
consistent with Hypothesis 4.)
Table 5: Effect of proportionality on responder votes (grand coalitions)
(20, 20, 60) (43, 14, 43) (60, 20, 20) (14, 43, 43)
Unanimity Responder 1 -.03 -.48 *** -.09 .22 ***
rule Responder 2 .24 *** .07 *
# of obs (174) (280) (174) (280)
# of ids (74;60) (67;85) (74) (85)
Majority Responder 1 -.14*** -.70 *** -.48*** .34***
rule Responder 2 .44 *** .19 ***
# of obs (234) (232) (234) (232)
# of ids (90;67) (57;86) (90) (86)
Responder 1’s contribution corresponds to the second individual in the contribution vector, responder 2 to
the third. The table reports average marginal effects of proposal location. (ai = 0 and ai = 1 correspond
to equal and proportional splits.) The coefficient can roughly be interpreted as the effect of proposing the
proportional rather than the equal split. (However, it is not evaluated at the equal split.) Under majority
rule, we only include ‘fitted’ grand coalitions in our regressions.
Turning to rates of passage, it is apparent that proposals fail more often in the asym-
metric situation (Figures ?? and ??) than in the symmetric situation (Figure ??, left
panel). Table ?? presents information on the overall passage rates in each of the situations
observed. Pooling all asymmetric situations, the overall rate of passage under unanimity
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Table 6: Passage rate by situation (all first round proposals)
(33,33,33) (20,20,60) (60,20,20) (14,43,43) (43,14,43) Total
Unanimity rule 94% 78% 71% 82% 81% 83%
189/201 136/174 62/87 115/140 228/280 730/882
Majority rule 95% 93% 84% 76% 95% 90%
196/207 217/234 98/117 88/116 220/232 819/906
Rank Sum p† 0.95 0.01 0.67 0.89 < 0.01 < 0.01
† Rank sum tests are based on fraction passed within each matching group (16 and 17 observations
for unanimity and majority rule, respectively).
rule is 79%, as compared to 94% in the symmetric situation. By comparing average pas-
sage rates within each matching group, we find that this difference is significant (Wilcoxon
signed-ranks test, p = 0.01, N = 16). This supports our Hypothesis 5.
Result 4. Under unanimity rule, the passage rate is larger in situations where claims are
symmetric as compared to situations in which claims are asymmetric. (Consistent with
Hypothesis 5.)
5.3 Asymmetric claims, majority rule
Now we turn to the majority rule treatment, and continue to look at situations where
subjects have heterogeneous claims. Figures ?? and ?? display the distribution of proposals
and the corresponding passage rates in detail. A salient pattern in these figures is that
proposals are concentrated in three distinct areas. As in the unanimity rule treatment, the
vast majority is located along a line connecting the three-way equal to the proportional
split. In addition, a small number of proposals are located along either the horizontal or
vertical axis, corresponding to minimum winning coalitions with responder 1 or responder 2,
respectively.
Looking only at the grand coalitions in the c = (20, 20, 60) and the c = (14, 43, 43)
situations, we observe that the distribution of proposals shifts towards the proportional
split when the proposer’s contribution is relatively larger (right panels). In these cases
the proposer suggests the proportional split three times as often in the c = (20, 20, 60)
(12% vs. 39%), and almost twice as often in the c = (14, 43, 43) situation (18% vs. 34%).
Although we observe few minimum winning coalitions ((20,20,60) 16%, (60,20,20) 19%,
(14,43,43) 9%, (43,14,43) 18%), the distribution of offers within these coalitions seems to
reflect claims. That is, a two-way equal split is proposed if both coalition partners have
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Figure 7: Proposals and passage rates, c = (20, 20, 60), majority rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=86)
25% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=93%
24% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=98%
12% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=93%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=43)
39% x=(60, 20, 20) pass=74%
21% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=96%
9% x=(40, 30, 30) pass=91%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 8: Proposals and passage rates, c = (14, 43, 43), majority rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=86)
30% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=91%
17% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=35%
14% x=(30, 35, 35) pass=81%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=43)
31% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=99%
25% x=(43, 14, 43) pass=97%
13% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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made the same contribution, whereas partners with higher (lower) contributions are offered
more (less) than the two-way equal split. For example, in the (20,20,60) the average offers
to responder 1 and 2 are 50 and 62%, respectively. In the (43,14,43) situation average
offers within MWCs are 37% to responder 1 and 50% to responder 2.
To study the composition and frequency of MWCs in more detail, we split proposals
into three categories according to whether they are closest to one of the axes or the line
connecting the equal and the proportional splits (extending out beyond those points).15
Thus, by this definition, a proposal that allocates a very small share to one responder
would be classified as a ‘fitted’ minimum winning coalition. Note that this measure will
classify more proposals as MWCs than a more ‘strict’ definition would. The percentage
of proposals that are thereby categorized as ‘fitted’ MWCs and ‘fitted’ grand coalitions is
summarized in Table ??. The left and right parts of the table provide information on all
periods and on the last 4 periods, respectively.
Table 7: Proposed coalition composition, majority rule
All periods Periods 9-12
MWC with Grand MWC with Grand
Situation resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition N resp. 1 resp. 2 coalition N
(33,33,33) 10% 3% 87% 207 15% 6% 79% 48
(20,20,60) 12% 5% 83% 234 18% 3% 79% 94
(60,20,20) 18% 5% 77% 117 26% 6% 68% 47
(14,43,43) 12% 1% 87% 116 24% 0% 76% 38
(43,14,43) 3% 15% 82% 232 5% 25% 70% 76
Total 10% 7% 83% 906 16% 10% 74% 303
Notes: ‘Situations’ are defined such that the first coordinate is the proposer, the second and
third are responder percentage contributions.
In every situation, we find that the vast majority of proposers (83%) build grand rather
than minimum winning coalitions (MWCs). Although the fraction of MWCs increases
somewhat over time, it remains low even in the last four experimental periods (26%).
This evidence is inconsistent with Hypothesis 6. Comparing the fraction of MWCs across
situations, we find that they are more frequent in asymmetric (18%) than in symmetric
15For this purpose, we compute the scalar projection onto the line connecting the three-way equal and
the proportional split. Thereafter, we calculate the Euclidean distance () of the vector connecting a
proposal to this line. In addition, we measure the distance to the horizontal and the vertical axes which
are x2 and x1 respectively. By comparing the length of the three vectors, we are able to identify a proposal
as ‘fitted grand coalition’ (i.e.  < x1 and  < x2) etc.
25
situations (13%). This difference persists, although smaller in size, in the last 4 periods
(21% vs. 27%) and is significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.06,
N = 10). Turning to the composition of MWCs, we do not find evidence that proposers
systemically exclude members with higher claims as conjectured in Hypothesis 7. In the
(20,20,60) situation, proposers are indeed more likely to include responder 1 who has
contributed a smaller share (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.08, N = 8).
However, in the (43,14,43) situation, proposers are more likely to include responder 2
who has made a larger contribution (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p < 0.01,
N = 10). This is despite the fact that responder 2 is offered higher shares when included
in a MWC than responder 1 (see above). Hence, when responders have different claims,
it appears that the proposer is more likely to include the responder who has contributed
the same share as the proposer. Thus, we do not find that the responder with the higher
claim is systematically excluded. This evidence stands in contrast to our Hypothesis 7.16
Result 5. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, the vast majority of proposers
attempt to build grand coalitions. Those who do build minimum winning coalitions are
more likely to include the responder who has made the same contribution as themselves.
(Inconsistent with Hypotheses 6 and 7.)
Focusing only on the ‘fitted’ grand coalitions, Figures ?? and ?? provide histograms of
the ai values (calculated as above - see Subsection ??). Among the ‘fitted’ grand coalitions,
we observe the same pattern as in the unanimity rule treatment. Namely, in both figures,
the distribution of proposals seems to be shifted to the right, i.e. towards the proportional
split, when the proposer has made a relatively large contribution (right panels). Using
matching group averages of ai as unit of observation, we find that the average values of ai
are indeed significantly larger when the proposer has made a relatively large contribution in
both situations (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test; (20,20,60), p < 0.01, N = 17;
(14,43, 43), p < 0.01, N = 16).
Result 6. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, proposers with larger contributions
are more likely to suggest the proportional split.
16In addition, we find that whenever responders have the same claims, proposers are more likely to
include responder 1. Remember that we ordered responders according to the letter i.d. they received
on the decision screen. That is, if the proposer’s i.d. is ‘A’, responder 1 corresponds to the individual
displayed as ‘B’ on the decision screen. If the proposer’s i.d. was instead ‘B’ responder 1 corresponds to
the individual displayed as ‘A’ on the decision screen. Hence, in both of these cases responder 1 is the
person displayed below the proposer on the decision screen which might have affected the likelihood of
receiving a positive offer.
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Turning to voting behavior, we explore how the location of a proposal affects the deci-
sion to vote ‘yes’. We do so separately for grand and minimum winning coalitions, starting
with the latter. As would be expected, the most important determinant of voting on MWC
proposals is whether a subject is included in the proposed coalition. If not, virtually all
subjects (96%) vote ‘no’. In contrast, those included vote ‘yes’ in 92% of all cases. To
test how the location of a proposal affects the decision to vote ‘yes’ within a MWC, we
run a Random-effects probit regression17, with the voting decision as dependent and the
period as well as the share being offered as the independent variables. Our tests reveal
that coalition members are more likely to vote ‘yes’ the higher the share they are offered
(Average marginal effect, β = 0.01, p = 0.04).
In a second step, we explore voting behavior within the ‘fitted’ grand coalitions that we
observe in the majority rule treatment. For this purpose, we again run a set of Random-
effects probit models, using the voting decision as dependent and the period as well as ai
as independent variables. The bottom half of Table ?? reports the average marginal effects
of ai on the decision to vote yes. In the (20, 20, 60) and the (43, 14, 43) situations, the
coefficient on ai is negative (and significant) for responder 1 and positive (and significant)
for responder 2. Consistent with this pattern, we find that the coefficient on ai is negative
(and significant) in the (60, 20, 20) and positive (and significant) in the (14, 43, 43) situation.
Hence, our findings indicate that individuals with relatively large claims are more likely
to vote yes if a proposal is closer to the proportional split while the opposite holds for
individuals with smaller claims.
Result 7. In asymmetric situations with majority rule, responders with larger contribu-
tions more often vote ‘yes’ the more proportional a proposal suggested in a grand coalition.
Responders included in a MWC more often vote ‘yes’ the larger the share they are being
offered.
In a last step we explore passage rates. As displayed in Table ??, we observe that
89% of the proposals pass in the asymmetric situations. This is significantly smaller than
the passage rate in symmetric situations which amounts to 95% (Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-ranks test, p = 0.01, N = 17) which supports our Hypothesis 8.18
17Each subject votes on the proposals of the other two group members. We use the voting decisions of
each individual as panel variable assuming that voting decisions are independent of individual character-
istics.
18We also do not find that the passage rate is larger in grand than in minimum winning coalitions
(Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.18, N = 12) although this result is based on few
observations. If subjects were able to anticipate or learn this over time, the fact that we observe few
27
Result 8. Under majority rule, the passage rate is larger in situations where claims are
symmetric as compared to situations in which claims are asymmetric. (Consistent with
Hypothesis 8.)
5.4 Majority versus Unanimity rule
So far, we have separately discussed outcomes under both rules. In contrast to our hy-
potheses, we find a remarkable number of similar patterns. First, average shares offered
increase in relative points contributed under both decision rules (see Table ??). Hence,
offers reflect claims even under majority rule. Second, we find that offers under both rules
are concentrated on a line connecting the three-way equal and proportional splits, moving
closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a relatively larger contribution.
Third, individuals with relatively large contributions are more likely to vote ‘yes’ the closer
a proposal to the proportional split. In this section, we analyze how the decision rule itself
affects offers as well as passage rates and explore differences in these common patterns.
We start by comparing the distribution of grand coalition offers (i.e. distribution of
ai) between treatments. The corresponding distributions for the (20, 20, 60) situation are
displayed in the left panels of Figures ?? and ??. It appears that the distribution is
shifted to the right (i.e. towards the proportional split) under unanimity as compared to
majority rule. In particular, we observe almost twice as many proportional proposals under
unanimity rule (31% vs. 14%). This is also the case in the (14, 43, 43) situation, depicted
in the left panels of Figures ?? and ??. Here, the fraction of proportional proposals is
19% under unanimity and only 5% under majority rule. By comparing the average values
of ai across matching groups, we find that proposals are indeed significantly closer to
the proportional split under unanimity rule in both situations (Wilcoxon rank-sum test;
(20, 20, 60), p = 0.02; (14, 43, 43), p = 0.01; N = 33). In contrast, we do not find that the
decision rule has a significant effect in the (43, 14, 43) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.26,
N = 32) and the (60, 20, 20) situations, i.e. when the proposer has made a relatively large
contribution (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p = 0.8, N = 33). These findings lend partial
support for our Hypothesis 9.
Result 9. Proposals under majority rule are less proportional (and more equal) as com-
pared to unanimity rule in situations where the proposer’s contribution is relatively small.
MWCs suggests that individuals prefer to form grand coalitions. We are unable to test this conjecture
given that we did not elicit beliefs over passage rates.
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Figure 9: Distribution of ai values in ‘fitted’ grand coalitions, c = (20, 20, 60),
majority rule
(a) (20, 20, 60) (N=195)
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(b) (60, 20, 20) (N=90)
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Figure 10: Distribution of ai values in ‘fitted’ grand coalitions, c =
(14, 43, 43), majority rule
(a) (14, 43, 43) (N=101)
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(b) (43, 14, 43) (N=190)
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In contrast, the degree of proportionality does not differ significantly when the proposer has
made a relatively large contribution. (Partially consistent with Hypothesis 9.)
As stated in Hypothesis 10, we are also interested in how the decision rule affects the
incidence of delay. Given that delay is costly in our setting, this allows us to comment on
the efficiency of agreements reached under both decision rules. Table ?? above summarizes
the passage rates under both decision rules for each situation observed in our experiment.
Averaged over all situations (including the symmetric ones), we find that the passage rate
is significantly higher under majority than under unanimity rule (83% vs. 90%, Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p < 0.01, N = 33). This difference in passage rates is slightly higher
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in the asymmetric situations (78% vs. 89%, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.01, N =
33). However, when comparing the passage rates in each situation separately, we find no
significant differences in the (60, 20, 20) situation, nor in the (14, 43, 43) situation. Hence,
we only find partial support for our Hypothesis 10.
Result 10. On average, the passage rate is significantly higher under majority as com-
pared to unanimity rule, especially when considering asymmetric situations only. However,
when comparing the passage rates under unanimity and majority rule for each situation
separately, we do not find significant differences in the (60, 20, 20) and the (14, 43, 43) sit-
uations. (Partially consistent with Hypothesis 10.)
5.5 Final Outcomes
So far, our analysis has focused on the first proposals within each game. In this section,
we will instead analyze final outcomes. As a first step, we want to assess how the decision
rule affects the length of the bargaining process, i.e. how many rounds of bargaining were
necessary before a given group reached agreement. Figure ?? plots the distribution of
bargaining rounds in the majority and the unanimity rule treatment. Although many
groups reach an immediate agreement under both rules (89% under majority and 82%
under unanimity rule), we observe significantly more groups which continue to bargain
over several rounds in the unanimity rule treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p < 0.01,
N = 33). Hence, this is additional support for the hypothesis that unanimity rule leads to
more delay as compared to majority rule.
To study final outcomes, we restrict our analysis to the first randomly selected proposal
which passes.19 In situations where the group members have made different contributions,
we will not distinguish between the points contributed by the proposer and the two respon-
ders, but instead simply study the share of the surplus received by each group member.
Given the large share of proposals which pass immediately, we would expect that the
final outcomes resemble initial proposals, analyzed in detail in the last sections. Figures
?? to ?? depict the distribution of final outcomes in all three situations. (In each Figure,
players are ordered according to the size of their contribution, from low to high.) The left
panels depict the distribution of final outcomes under unanimity rule, the right panels those
19The number of observations that we observe for each constellation of points can be inferred from Table
??. Only one of the groups in the (1, 1, 3) situation did not reach an agreement in the unanimity treatment.
As in the previous sections, we will focus on relative contributions and, thus, pool the cases in which all
group members have either contributed one or three points.
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Figure 11: Rounds before reaching agreement
under majority rule. Indeed, we observe the exact same patterns as in the previous sections:
First, final bargaining outcomes are quite similar under both decision rules. Most notably,
we continue to observe few minimum winning coalitions being formed under majority rule.
Second, almost all grand coalitions are located on a line connecting the equal and the
proportional splits. However, comparing the left and right panels of Figures 13 and 14, we
see that outcomes move away from the proportional split under majority rule. For example,
in the (14, 43, 43) situation, the fraction of proportional outcomes falls from 49% to 34%
when moving from unanimity to majority rule. Using scalar projections (see above), we
find that outcomes are indeed significantly less proportional under majority rule in the
(20,20,60) situation (Ranksum test,p = 0.09 N = 33) but not in the (14,43,43) situation
(Ranksum test, p = 0.14). Hence, outcomes are less proportional under majority rule when
a majority of individuals have made relatively small contributions (i.e. in the (20,20,60)
situation) but not if a majority of individuals have made relatively large contributions (i.e.
in the (14,43,43) situation).
Result 11. The final outcomes in grand coalitions are less proportional under majority as
compared to unanimity rule if at least two group members have contributed less than 33%
to the surplus. Otherwise, we do not find any difference between the final outcomes in the
majority and unanimity rule treatments.
As noted above, we observe few MWCs among the final outcomes. Using the same
classification of proposals as above, 17% of the final outcomes can be classified as fitted
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Figure 12: Final outcomes in c = (33, 33, 33)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=67)
85% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
7% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=100%
6% x=(33, 34, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=69)
70% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
6% x=(33, 34, 33)pass=100%
6% x=(33, 33, 34)pass=100%
6% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
Figure 13: Final outcomes in c = (20, 20, 60)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=87)
31% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
30% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=100%
14% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=117)
26% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=100%
20% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=100%
18% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Figure 14: Final outcomes in c = (14, 43, 43)
(a) Unanimity rule (N=140)
49% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=100%
29% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=100%
11% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) Majority rule (N=116)
34% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=100%
17% x=(14, 43, 43) pass=100%
9% x=(0, 50, 50) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
minimum winning coalitions, while 82% are grand coalitions. Table ?? depicts the relative
frequency with which we observe MWCs for each pair of group members in all periods
(left) and the last 4 periods (right). As in our previous analysis, we do not find evidence
that group members with higher contributions are systematically excluded from MWCs.
For example, in the (20,20,60) situation 20% of final outcomes suggest a MWC. Of these,
11% include the group member who has contributed 60% to the surplus.
Table 8: Coalition composition, final agreements (majority rule)
MWC Grand Fitted MWC Fitted Grand
Situation 1&2 1&3 2&3 coalition 1&2 1&3 2&3 coalition N
(33,33,33) 9% 6% 0% 86% 10% 6% 0% 84% 69
(20,20,60) 9% 3% 8% 81% 9% 3% 8% 80% 117
(14,43,43) 3% 4% 11% 82% 3% 4% 11% 81% 116
Total 6% 4% 7% 82% 7% 4% 7% 81% 302
6 Conclusion
We experimentally investigate how claims, derived from relative contributions to a com-
monly produced surplus, affect bargaining behavior and outcomes under two decision rules,
namely unanimity and majority rule. Under unanimity rule, each group member possesses
veto power which may be used to defend one’s claim. Hence, while unanimity rule might
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result in fair (in the sense of proportionality) outcomes, endowing each party with veto
power could cause severe delay. Majority rule, on the other hand, enables a minimum
winning coalition to ignore the claims of a minority member. While this may reduce the
degree of proportionality reflected in final outcomes and, consequently, be deemed unfair,
requiring fewer group members to consent might allow groups to reach an agreement more
quickly.
We study how claims affect fairness and efficiency in a laboratory experiment in which
groups of three subjects first jointly produce a surplus and then bargain over the dis-
tribution of the surplus. Bargaining takes place in a finite horizon Baron and Ferejohn
framework. Across treatments, we vary whether two or all three group members have to
agree on a proposed division of the surplus. In line with previous evidence, we find that
claims affect proposals and final outcomes under unanimity rule. Specifically, offers re-
ceived increase in relative points contributed. A closer inspection reveals that virtually all
proposals are located between the equal and the proportional split. In addition, we find
that proposals are closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a relatively large
contribution, and hence benefits from receiving the proportional instead of the three-way
equal share. Studying voting behavior, we find that individuals with higher claims are also
more likely to vote yes the closer the proposal to the proportional split.
Turning to majority rule, we detect many similar patterns. In contrast to previous
experiments without claims, we find that a majority of proposers suggests a grand instead
of a minimum winning coalition and that average offers reflect the ranking of contribu-
tions. This is despite the fact that minimum winning coalitions are as likely to pass as
grand coalitions. Although we observe few minimum winning coalitions, proposers are
more likely to include group members who have made the same contributions. This behav-
ior might result from the fact that there is a clear norm to share the benefits equally with
partners who have contributed the same amount, while it is more difficult to assess how
much needs to be offered to individuals with higher or lower contributions. Within grand
coalitions, proposals are closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a rela-
tively large contribution. Thus, under both decision rules we find that proposers attempt
to implement the proportional split more often if they have made a relatively large con-
tribution. Conversely, they attempt to distribute the surplus more equally whenever they
have made a relatively small contribution. In these latter cases, we find that proposals as
well as final outcomes outcomes are closer to the equal split under majority as compared to
unanimity rule. In terms of efficiency, we find that majority rule leads to a higher passage
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rate, especially in situations in which individuals have made different contributions.
While we do find that the decision rule affects proposer behavior, final outcomes as well
as the incidence of delay, these differences are not as large as one might have expected based
on previous Baron and Ferejohn experiments without claims. In these papers, differences in
offers under unanimity and majority rule are mostly driven by the fact that proposers form
minimum winning coalitions under majority rule. Our results suggest that the willingness
to do so is substantially reduced when all individuals have contributed to the surplus
via a real effort task. This result is likely to reflect fairness perceptions, i.e. proposers
deliberately choose to respect claims because they regard this as fair.
Our paper shows that the differences between the two decision rules are instead more
subtle in the presence of claims. In particular, we do observe that individuals strategically
propose and approve less proportional distributions whenever this is to their own advan-
tage and whenever the decision rule leaves them more discretion to ignore the claims of
other group members (as under majority rule). This results in less proportional outcomes,
whenever a majority of group members has contributed relatively little. Given that indi-
viduals seem to balance their offers between two prevalent fairness norms, proportionality
and equality, this behavior may be indicative of a self serving bias in fairness norms. That
is, in a given situation, individuals opportunistically choose the fairness norm which suits
their own interests most (??). Although the consequences for high contributors are not
as drastic as, for example, being excluded from a coalition, this behavior certainly shows
that individuals are willing to ignore the claims to the benefit of more equality within the
group.
These (latter) findings may also be relevant for real world instances of bargaining with
claims, such as budget allocation within the EU. Several recent reforms of the EU decision
rules appear to be motivated by settling the conflict between redistribution from richer
to poorer member states and preserving proportionality at the same time. While redistri-
bution from poorer to richer member states is an explicit goal of the EU, richer member
states provide most of the budget and also represent a majority of the population. Hence,
preserving proportionality might be an important goal in order to secure support from the
voters in these countries and to preserve the EU’s legitimacy. Several recent voting reforms
have indeed shifted voting rights from newer and poorer member states to older and richer
member states. Research in political science suggests that this voting reform has led to
more proportional outcomes which come at the cost of less equal outcomes. For example,
with the 2004 enlargement the EU moved from the traditionally employed unanimity rule
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to a system with qualified majority rule and country voting weights, allocated roughly
approximate to population. It has been shown that members with higher voting weights
were in fact able to secure higher shares of structural and agricultural funds (?). The latest
reform implemented a system of double majority, according to which a proposal passes if
it is approved by 55% of the member states who represent at least 65% of the population.
Effectively, this reform has been found to redistribute voting weights from newer towards
older EU15 members, especially to Germany (?). Although our experiment is not directly
applicable to the complex institutional setting of the EU, we believe that it captures some
relevant facts on how decision rules affect the distribution of benefits and may, thus, be
informative for the public discourse about optimal decision rules.
———— APPENDIX For online Publication ——–
A Analysis of excluded cases
In this section, we provide an analysis of all cases in which at least one of the group
members has contributed 0 points to the surplus. We excluded these cases because they are
relatively rare and do not occur in every matching group, leaving us with few independent
observations to test for differences between and within treatments. Table ?? summarizes
the frequency with which we observed the various constellations of points. As in pour main
analysis above, we will pool data from the first and second as well as the third and forth
situation in which the relative contributions are the same.
Given that all subjects in each group make a proposal, we observe three proposals for
each game. Table ?? presents the number of proposals we observe in each of the 7 possible
situations. The first coordinate of the contribution vector denotes the relative points of
Table 9: Constellation of points contributed (excluded cases)
Number of games
Contributions Surplus Majority rule Unanimity rule
(0,0,1) 5 EUR 12 3
(0,0,3) 15 EUR 8 5
(0,1,1) 10 EUR 24 10
(0,3,3) 30 EUR 15 29
(0,1,3) 20 EUR 43 42
Total 102 89
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Table 10: Situations observed (Excluded cases)
Percentage Number of proposals
Contributions Majority rule Unanimity rule
(0,0,100) 40 16
(100,0,0) 20 8
(0,50,50) 39 39
(50,0,50) 78 78
(0,25,75) 43 42
(25,0,75) 43 42
(75,0,25) 43 42
Total 306 267
Figure 15: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 0, 100), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 0, 100) (N=16)
25% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=100%
19% x=(30, 30, 40) pass=0%
12% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=50%
12% x=(0, 0, 100) pass=0%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (100, 0, 0) (N=8)
50% x=(100, 0, 0) pass=0%
25% x=(80, 10, 10) pass=50%
12% x=(98, 1, 1) pass=0%
12% x=(60, 20, 20)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
the proposer. In situations where relative contributions differ, we will distinguish whether
the proposer has made no, an intermediate or a large contribution. When responder
contributions differ, the responder with the smaller contribution is listed first. When
responder contributions are the same, they are ordered alphabetically, according to the
letter i.d. that players were assigned at the beginning of the game.
Unanimity Rule We begin by discussing outcomes under unanimity rule. Figures ??
to ?? display the distribution of proposals under unanimity rule. In all figures, the left
panels display the cases in which the proposer has contributed nothing, while the right
panels display cases in which the proposer has made a positive contribution.
In the c = (0, 0, 100) and the c = (0, 50, 50) situation we observe that a large majority
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Figure 16: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 50, 50), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 50, 50) (N=39)
44% x=(10, 45, 45) pass=88%
18% x=(20, 40, 40) pass=86%
8% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (50, 0, 50) (N=78)
46% x=(45, 10, 45) pass=81%
17% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=23%
6% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=80%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
of proposals is located on a line connecting the equal and the proportional splits. Proposals
which are not located on this line are almost always rejected. In the c = (0, 25, 75) situa-
tion, proposals are concentrated around the line connecting the equal and the proportional
splits. The fact that proposals are farther away from the line might be explained by the
fact that all subjects have contributed different amounts, making it more complicated to
target points on the line. As in our main analysis, we find that the distribution of propos-
als appears to be closer to the proportional split whenever the proposer has contributed a
positive share (right panels) as compared to having contributed nothing. We do, however,
observe that proportional splits pass with a small probability in all situations (i.e. 0%
passage rate in the (0, 0, 100) situation). As in our main analysis, we take advantage of
the fact that all proposals are located on or close to the line connecting the equal and the
proportional split. This allows us to reduce the data to a single dimension by identifying
the scalar projection (see section ??) onto this line for each proposal. Hence, each proposal
is characterized by a parameter ai where ai = 0 corresponds to the equal and ai = 1 to
the proportional split. We use the average values of ai within each matching group to test
for differences in distributions in situations where proposers have made smaller as com-
pared to having made larger contributions. Only in the c = (0, 50, 50) situation we find
that proposals are indeed closer to the proportional split when the proposer’s contribu-
tion is 50% compared to cases in which the proposer has contributed nothing (Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.02, N = 12). In all other cases, we do not find
any significant differences ((0, 0, 100) versus (100,0,0): p = 0.12, N = 6; (0, 25, 75) versus
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Figure 17: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 25, 75), Unanimity rule
(a) (0, 25, 75) (N=42)
26% x=(10, 20, 70) pass=64%
14% x=(20, 30, 50) pass=83%
7% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=100%
7% x=(25, 25, 50) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (25, 0, 75) (N=42)
21% x=(20, 10, 70) pass=78%
14% x=(30, 10, 60) pass=83%
7% x=(34, 33, 33) pass=67%
7% x=(40, 10, 50) pass=0%
7% x=(25, 5, 70) pass=33%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (75, 0, 25) (N=42)
17% x=(50, 20, 30) pass=71%
14% x=(70, 10, 20) pass=67%
14% x=(60, 10, 30) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Figure 18: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 0, 100), Majority rule
(a) (0, 0, 100) (N=40)
15% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
15% x=(20, 20, 60) pass=83%
12% x=(33, 33, 34) pass=80%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (100, 0, 0) (N=20)
20% x=(100, 0, 0) pass=0%
15% x=(50, 25, 25) pass=67%
10% x=(80, 10, 10) pass=50%
10% x=(60, 20, 20)pass=100%
10% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(75, 0, 25): p = 0.66, N = 13).20
Majority Rule In the following, we will present the results for majority rule. We begin
our discussion of results by looking at the size of coalitions under majority rule. Table ??
summarizes the share of proposals which can be classified as minimum winning coalitions
(MWCs), proportional splits, and grand coalitions. Given that in all situations, the pro-
portional split is essentially a MWCs (i.e. one group member receives 0), we distinguish
between proposals which suggest a proportional split and attempted minimum winning
coalitions. The left and right parts of the table provide information on all periods and on
the last 4 periods, respectively. Most notably, we find that the vast majority of proposers
suggest grand instead of minimum winning coalitions in all situations (24% vs. 52%). This
difference is, however, much smaller in the last 4 rounds (37% vs. 39%), i.e. after subjects
have gained some experience.
Interestingly, we observe that 23% of the proposers suggest the proportional split. This
fraction is especially high in situations where the proposer has made a positive contribution.
The high fraction of proportional proposals is indeed interesting given that we observe few
minimum winning coalitions being proposed in this and the previous Results section. Thus,
our findings suggest that proposers may be more willing to offer nothing to some group
20Given that we do not observe any constellation of points in all 16 matching groups, the number of
observations that we use for our tests ranges from 6 to 13.
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Figure 19: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 50, 50), Majority rule
(a) (0, 50, 50) (N=39)
28% x=(20, 40, 40)pass=91%
13% x=(10, 45, 45)pass=100%
8% x=(45, 55, 0)pass=100%
8% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=33%
8% x=(30, 35, 35)pass=67%
8% x=(0, 50, 50)pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (50, 0, 50) (N=78)
60% x=(50, 0, 50) pass=100%
15% x=(45, 10, 45) pass=100%
5% x=(40, 20, 40) pass=100%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
members if such proposals can be justified by proportionality.
In order to study the composition of minimum winning coalitions, we computed the
inclusion frequencies for each responder. In contrast to our results in subsection ??, we do
not find that proposer are more likely to include the individual who has made the same
contribution in the first 4 situations. For example, in the (50, 0, 50) situation, proposers
are more likely to include responder 1 instead of responder 2 who has contributed the same
share of points as the proposer. However, given that the proposer more often includes the
responder with the lower claim, this finding is consistent with Hypothesis 7. In the last
three situations, where all group members have made different contributions, we find that
proposers are more likely to include responder 2 (who has contributed a positive amount in
all cases) if the proposer has made a positive contribution himself. Instead, if the proposer
has contributed nothing, responder 2 is never included.
In order to study the distribution of proposals in more detail, we turn to Figures ?? to
??. It is apparent that proposals are concentrated in three areas: as in the unanimity rule
treatment, the vast majority of proposals is located on a line connecting the equal and the
proportional split. In addition, many proposals are located along either the horizontal or
the vertical line, corresponding to minimum winning coalitions with responder 1 or respon-
der 2, respectively. Looking only at the grand coalitions, it appears that the distribution
of proposals is closer to the proportional split if the proposer has made a positive contribu-
tion (right panels). In these cases, the proposer also suggests the proportional split more
often. However, this attempt to distribute the surplus more proportionally leads to a high
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Figure 20: Proposals and passage rates, c = (0, 25, 75), Majority rule
(a) (0, 25, 75) (N=43)
33% x=(10, 20, 70)pass=100%
9% x=(50, 50, 0) pass=100%
7% x=(40, 60, 0) pass=100%
7% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=100%
7% x=(10, 30, 60) pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(b) (25, 0, 75) (N=43)
19% x=(25, 0, 75)pass=100%
9% x=(30, 0, 70)pass=100%
7% x=(50, 50, 0)pass=100%
7% x=(34, 33, 33)pass=67%
7% x=(50, 0, 50)pass=100%
7% x=(30, 10, 60)pass=100%
7% x=(40, 0, 60)pass=67%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
(c) (75, 0, 25) (N=43)
16% x=(75, 0, 25) pass=100%
12% x=(60, 10, 30) pass=80%
9% x=(70, 0, 30) pass=75%
(100,0,0)
(0,0,100)
(0,100,0)
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Table 11: Coalition Composition (Excluded cases)
all periods periods 9-12
Situation MWC with Propor- Grand N MWC with Propor- Grand N
resp.1 resp.2 tional resp.1 resp.2 tional
(0,0,100)† 18% 15% 0% 65% 40 31% 19% 0% 44% 16
(100,0,0) 15% 5% 20% 60% 20 13% 13% 25% 50% 8
(0,50,50)† 18% 5% 8% 67% 39 44% 11% 0% 44% 9
(50,0,50) 9% 4% 60% 27% 78 28% 0 % 67% 6% 18
(0,25,75) 19% 0% 0% 81% 43 29% 0% 0% 71% 17
(25,0,75)† 14% 26% 19% 40% 43 24% 24% 30% 24% 17
(75,0,25) 12% 19% 16% 53% 43 24% 6% 24% 47% 17
Total 14% 10% 23% 52% 306 27% 10% 23% 39% 102
† In each of these three situations, we observe one proposals in which the proposer suggests 100% for
himself. Given that this is neither a minimum winning coalition with responder 1 or responder 2 nor
a grand coalition, we can classify less than 100% of the proposals in these three situations.
rejection rate whenever two individuals have contributed less than the equal split ((75,0,25)
and (100,0,0)). In order to test whether the distribution is significantly closer to the pro-
portional split whenever the proposer has made a positive contribution (right panels), we
first compute the number of ‘fitted grand coalitions’ (see section ??) and then compare
the average values of ai within matching groups. Only in the c = (0, 50, 50) situation, we
find that the average values of ai are indeed larger when the proposer has made a posi-
tive as compared to no contribution (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, p = 0.03,
N = 12). Hence, in these cases proposals are indeed significantly closer to the proportional
split if the proposer has made a positive as compared to no contribution. In the other
two situations, we do not find any difference (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test;
(0,0,100) vs. (100,0,0), p = 0.12, N = 6; (0,0,100) vs. (75,0,25), p = 0.66, N = 13). Our
tests are, however, based on a very small sample because we did not observe each situation
in all 17 matching groups.
Turning to the passage rate, Table ?? summarizes the passage rate in each of the
situations. First and most notably, the passage rate is smaller compared to the situations
in which all group members have made a positive contribution (83% under unanimity,
90% under majority rule, see Table ??). Second, the passage rate is significantly smaller
under unanimity as compared to majority rule in all situations except in the (100, 0, 0).
Hence, compared to the situations discussed in the main text, we find a more pronounced
difference in passage rates between majority and unanimity rule. This further supports
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Table 12: Passage rate by situations (excluded cases)
(0,0,100) (100,0,0) (0,50,50) (50,0,50) (0,25,75) (25,0,75) (75,0,25) Total
Unanimity 44% 25% 64% 58% 64% 55% 62% 59%
rule 7/16 2/8 25/39 45/78 27/42 23/42 26/42 155/267
Majority 80% 50% 85% 95% 98% 91% 88% 88%
rule 32/40 10/20 33/39 74/78 42/43 39/43 38/43 268/306
Rank-sum p 0.01 0.89 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.03 < 0.01 0.02 < 0.01
N † 6/8 6/8 12/13 12/13 14/13 14/13 14/13 14/16
† The Wilcoxon rank-sum test test is based on the passage rate within each matching group. The number
of observations in the Unanimity / Majority treatment are reported in the bottom row. (Note that we do
not observe all situations in every matching group.)
our Hypothesis 10.
B Instructions (translated from German)
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---------------------------------------------------------- Page 1 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Dear Participant,  
Thank you for attending this experiment. Before we describe today’s experiment in more detail, we 
would like to inform you about some general rules:  
General rules:  
• This experiment lasts for approximately 70 minutes. During this time, you should not leave 
your seat.  
• Please turn off your mobile phone and store it in your pocket or bag. There should not be 
anything on your table. (A beverage is of course allowed.) 
• Please be quiet during this experiment and do not talk to other participants.  
• If you have any questions, please raise your hand and wait for the experimenter to attend 
you at your seat.  
• For your participation, you will receive a four Euro show-up fee. However, you can earn 
more money in this experiment. How much money you can earn depends on your own as 
well as the choices of other participants.  
 
What happens at the end of this experiment?  
Once all participants have finished this experiment, the experimenter will call the participants to the 
front desk one after another. You will then receive your payment. 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 2 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Description of the experiment  
This experiment has two parts. 
 
Part 1 consists of 12 quiz blocks. In each quiz block you have to answer two questions. For each 
question, 4 possible answers are given. Only one of these answers is correct.  
In each quiz block you can earn between 0 and 3 points by selecting the correct answers: You earn 1 
point if you are able to answer one question correctly. If you answer both questions correctly, you 
earn 3 points. However, if you answer none of the two questions correctly, you will earn 0 points. 
You will not be informed how many points you collected in any of the quiz blocks.  
Please note: All participants have to answer the exact same questions.  
 
Part 2 of this experiment also consists of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, groups of 3 
participants will be randomly formed. For each round, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 
quiz blocks from part 1 for each participant in the group. The points that the group member have 
collected in the randomly chosen quiz blocks will be added. For each point collected, the group 
receives five Euro. The group’s task is to bargain over the distribution of this surplus. 
You will receive more instructions for part 2 after you and all other participants have completed part 
1.  
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Your payment at the end of the experiment 
Once all groups have finished part 2, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 rounds in part 2 of 
this experiment. All participants receive the amount agreed upon in this randomly selected round.  
 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Examples for part 1:  
Here is an example of what you will see in each of the 12 quiz blocks (in German): 
 
 Displayed on the top right of the screen are the quiz block number.  
 The first question is displayed in the left; the second question is displayed in the right box.  
 The 4 possible answers are displayed below each question and numbered from 1 to 4.  
 Please type the number of the correct answer into the field labeled “Your answer”. For 
example, if you think that answer number 1 is correct, type “1” into the field.  
 As soon as you have typed an answer into both fields, please click on the “OK” button. You 
will then move to the next quiz block.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 4 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Details for the 2nd part of this experiment  
Part 2 of this experiment consists of 12 rounds. At the beginning of each round, groups of three 
participants will be randomly formed. Thus, you will interact with different participants in each 
round. No participant will know with whom he or she has been grouped during the experiment.  
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At the beginning of every round, each participant in a group will be assigned an ID (“A”, “B” or “C”). 
These IDs remain fixed throughout the round.  
In every round, the computer randomly selects one of the 12 quiz blocks for each participant. Then, 
each participant will be informed which quiz block has been drawn for him / her personally and he 
/she will see how many points he / she has collected in the randomly selected quiz block. You will 
also be informed about the number of points collected by the other two group members. However, 
you will not be informed about the quiz block that was selected for the other two participants. 
All points collected in the randomly chosen quiz blocks are then added. The group receives 5 Euro 
for each point collected by its members. For example, if all three participants have collected 3 
points, the group receives 15 Euro.  
The group’s task is to bargain how to divide the surplus which the group has received among the 
members of the group.  
Decisions are made by majority rule, using the following procedure: 
First, every participant makes a proposal as to how much each group member should receive 
(expressed in percent of the surplus). Next, all group members vote “yes” or “no” on the proposal of 
each group member. Finally, one of the proposals is randomly chosen and votes are counted. If at 
least two group members voted “yes” on the randomly chosen proposal, it passes and the round 
ends. If less than two group members voted “yes”, the proposal is rejected and bargaining continues. 
In this case, the available surplus shrinks by 20 percent (e.g. from 15 to 12 Euro). Then, all 
participants make a proposal and vote on the proposals of all group members. If the randomly 
chosen proposal is rejected again, the surplus shrinks by 20 percent once more (e.g. from 12 to 8.60 
Euro), etc.  
The round ends as soon as at least two group members vote “yes” on the randomly chosen 
proposal. In addition, a round ends if the available surplus shrinks below 2 Euro. In this case, all 
group members receive 0 Euro.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Examples for part 2:  
Here is an example of what you will see on the proposal screen (in German):  
 
• Displayed on the top are the current period, your id and the available surplus (in Euro). 
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• The table displays how many points the group has collected in total. In addition, the table 
reports each group member’s contribution in points and his/her share of contributed points 
in percent. (The displayed shares are rounded.)    
• Below, you will find three boxes into which you must type your proposal. You must type the 
share of the pie (%) you wish to allocate to “A” (upper box), the share of the pie (%) you wish 
to allocate to “B” (middle box), and the share of the pie (%) you wish to allocate to “C” (lower 
box). You can allocate at most 100 percent.  
After all three participants in the group have submitted a proposal, you will move to the voting 
screen.   
 
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Here is an example of what you will see on the voting screen (in German). In this Example, we 
assume that all group members propose to give 100 percent off the surplus to participant “A”.  
 
• The top part of the screen contains the same information as the previous proposal screen.  
• Below, you will see each of the submitted proposals displayed both numerically (percent 
share and exact amount in Euro) and graphically (as pie chart). 
• To the right of each proposal, you will find the buttons used to vote on the proposals.  
• After selecting yes or no for each proposal, click submit to cast your votes. 
As soon as all group members have cast their votes, you will move to the Results screen.  
---------------------------------------------------------- Page 7 ---------------------------------------------------- 
Here is an example of what you will see on the Results screen (in German):  
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 • The proposals are displayed on the left side of the screen.  
• On the right side, you can see whether the other participants voted “yes” or “no” on a 
proposal. At the very right, you will be informed whether the proposal has passed or whether 
it has been rejected.  
• The votes will only count for the randomly selected proposal, marked in red.  
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